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Abstract 
There is a fear that if Turkey were given admission to the EU massive migration to the 
other member countries of the EU would result. This paper develops a theoretical 
framework for the migration decision that takes into consideration the impact on 
uncertainty of some of the important economic and social variables that are addressed by 
the EU membership and institutions. It emphasizes future expectations of living 
conditions and the level of uncertainty associated with them as a key variable in making 
migration decisions. It suggests that the more prosperous and stable Turkey is expected to 
be in the future the less likely a person will now want to migrate. Hence, the greater 
certainty now that Turkey will gain admission in to EU, the more attractive is it for 
potential migrants to remain in Turkey. This framework suggests that measures to hinder 
Turkey’s entry into the EU by having national referendums to approve its entry will 
increase the uncertainty of the future economic and social prospects in Turkey and will 
encourage migrants to migrate now to the member countries of the EU. 
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Some people and some member governments of the EU  fear that Turkey’s accession to 
the EU could lead to a massive inflow of Turkish labour to the higher income countries of 
the union (Aydinli and Waxman, 2001; Martin, Midgley and Teitelbaum, 2001; Avci, 
2002; Flam, 2003; Chislett, 2004; Grabbe, 2004; Casanova, 2006). The political response 
of such countries as France and Austria has been to erect additional barriers to Turkey’s 
entry beyond its satisfying the conditions of the acquis communautaire
1. In this paper we 
discuss how the migration decisions of potential Turkish migrants to EU member states 
are likely to be influenced by some of these political economy issues surrounding 
Turkey’s accession process between now and the time when a final decision is made on 
Turkey’s entry to the EU. 
 
In particular we examine how these additional uncertainties will likely affect the 
migration decision of potential Turkish migrants. 
 
A Cost-Benefit Model of Migration with Uncertainty 
 
From the early economic studies of migration (Sjaastad, 1962), the decision to migrate 
has been considered as an investment decision by individuals to increase the productivity 
of their human resources. As an investment, it involves initial costs and opportunity costs 
that are expected to be compensated over time by a better life in the place to which they 
migrated.  
 
The private costs and returns of migration can be classified into two broad categories, 
monetary and non-monetary costs. Framing the decision to migrate in terms of a cost 
benefit analysis, the potential migrants are evaluating the welfare they would get over 
                                                 
1 The complete body of EU legislation. http://en.euabc.com/word/12   2
their lifetime, and perhaps their children’s lifetimes, if they migrate. This situation is 
compared to the welfare they and their children would expect to have if they were not to 
migrate.  
 
Following Parikh and Van Leuvensteijn (2003), the present value (PVB) of migrating is 
the difference in the expected utility stream that an individual obtains over her/his 
planning horizon if s/he remains in the home country, h, as compared to the expected 
utility stream s/he obtains if s/he migrate abroad, f. These utility streams will be a 
function not only of current income differentials between the home and the prospective 
host countries but also the future income differentials between these locations. These 
utilities are obtained from the total personal and social wealth in both locations, W
h and 
W
f, at each point in time, less the cost in utility arising from the direct costs of migration. 
This relationship can be expressed as; 
 
NPVm
m h f PVc W U E PV W U E PV − − = )]] ( [ [ )]] ( [ [                                                 (1) 
 
 where 
m PVc  denotes the present value of the direct costs of migration expressed in 
terms of utility. This gives us a decision criterion for migration. If the net present value of 
migrating, NPVm, for the individual is positive, s/he should migrate, and if it is negative, 
s/he should stay in her/his home country.   
 
We assume that the direct cost of migration, in terms of both expenditures and time, are 
known by the potential migrant with a high degree of certainty. These costs may include 
such items as the cost of obtaining visas and work permits, transportation and perhaps, 
the cost of learning a new language. 
  
Most studies of migration, including those of Turkish migration to the EU countries, have 
introduced uncertainty and its associated costs into the analysis. Thus, uncertainty was 
thought to arise from the problem of finding suitable employment quickly in the 
destination country (Hatton, 1995; Bentivogli and Pagano, 1999; Fertig, 2001). In these 
and other studies the only the uncertainty facing the individual was the uncertainty they   3
would experience if they migrate. If they remain at home, the future is assumed to be 
known with certainty.  
 
In this paper, we wish to consider the uncertainties facing a potential migrant in a much 
broader sense, both in the destination and in the home country. This uncertainty includes 
the conditions of the labour market that traditionally have been included as determinants 
of migration and also other areas of uncertainty that the EU institutions are specifically 
designed to address. These include such factors as political stability, macro-economic 
stability, financial market stability, security and human rights guarantees.  
 
To capture these longer term uncertainty variables in a simple, but realistic, manner we 
first assume that the individual’s utility function for a potential migrant is characterized 
by constant risk aversion with respect to the level of wealth. We continue this 
characterization of the individual’s utility function with the assumption that these people 
will face threats to their wealth over time that follow a normal distribution whether they 
reside in their home or the foreign country. We describe the distribution of wealth 
outcomes from living in the home country as having a mean of  wh µ , and variance of 
2
wh σ . 
Then the probability density function for wealth











Where,  wh wh h w z σ µ / ) [( − = . 
 
Suppose these individuals have utility functions that can be expressed as an exponential 
of the individuals’ wealth at any point in time; 
 
AW e W U
− − = ) ( .                                           (2) 
 
Where A is the individuals’ risk aversion parameter that determines the size of the 
negative affects that the variability of wealth has on utility. This form of an individual 
                                                 
2 A derivation of these properties of a normal probability density function  can be found in  Nicholson, 
2005, pp556)    
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utility function has been widely used in the economic literature (Levy and Markowitz, 
1979). Given the assumption about the nature of the uncertainty of future wealth, the 
expected utility from his or her risky wealth at each point in time, if residing in the home 
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Hence, the expected utility of an individual is expressed as a linear function of the two 
parameters of her wealth probability density function, the mean of the expected wealth, 





σ ∗ − . The cost of risk term is a function of the 
variance of wealth and the individual’s risk aversion parameter A. This parameter (A) 
determines the size of the negative effect of the variability of wealth on the expected 
utility of the person. The role that risk aversion plays in determining the decision to 
migrate has been explored by Parikh and Van Leuvensteijn (2003). Berger and Gabriel 
(1991) have also estimated the impact that risk aversion had on the type of jobs selected 
by immigrants and its ultimate effect on earnings.  
 
An exact same form of the individual’s utility function and the variables that determine 
utility can be used to describe the expected utility of the potential migrants if they in fact 
decide to migrate to the foreign country. These variables are denoted by subscript f. 
Hence, substituting equation (4) (for both the home and foreign locations) into equation 
(1), the present value of the difference in expected utility streams of an individual in the 
home country, h, and abroad, f, can be described as follows: 
   5
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The decision of a potential migrant depends on the expected net present value of 
differences between the expected wealth from living in the home and in the foreign 
country, and the differences in the variances of wealth that the potential migrant faces in 
both the home and destination countries adjusted by the individual’s risk aversion 
parameter (A). Finally there are the direct costs associated with migrating. If these 
specific costs of migration are known with certainty and, given the form of the utility 
function, their present value in monetary units can be just subtracted from equation (6). A 
potential migrant will decide to migrate if the expected net present value of migration, 
NPVm, over her/his planning horizon is positive.  
 
If the size of expected wealth,  wh µ , from living in the home country increases, other 
things remaining the same, the size of NPVm decreases leading to an decrease in the 
incentive for the person to migrate. If only the uncertainty about the future living 
conditions in the home country increases, then we would expect that the variance of the 
wealth in the home country would increase for a potential migrant, leading to an increase 
in the incentive to migrate. Finally, the higher are the costs associated with 
migration,
m PVc , the lower will be the incentive to migrate. 
 
An individual will find it more attractive to migrate to the foreign country the greater is 
the difference between the mean values of the expected wealth in the foreign country and 
that of the home country. Likewise, the attraction to migrate is greater, the smaller is the 
variance of wealth in the foreign country as compared to that of the home country.  Of 
course it is the combination of both the effects of the differences in the expected values of   6
wealth in both locations, offset by the differences in the variances of wealth (cost of 
uncertainty) in the two locations that determine the present value of the migration 
decision. 
 
Formulating the determinants of migration in this way, the decision to migrate is based on 
the expectations of the utility they expect to enjoy if they remain in the home country 
relative to what they expect to enjoy if they migrate. Of course, the actual number of 
people who migrate for a given PV of benefits will depend on the degree of migration 
restrictions imposed by the foreign countries on those wishing to migrate from any 
particular home country. Given any system of restrictions, however, it is reasonable to 
assume that the higher the expected NPVm from migration, the large will be the numbers 
of determined, and successful, migrants who make the move.  This framework can be 
used to analyze a number of migration phenomena that have taken place in recent years.  
 
Applying Model to Explain Previous Intra-EU Migration Flows 
 
It was the view of some analysts studying European migration, prior to the entry of 
Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986) into the EU, that massive migration flow from 
these countries to the higher income countries in EU would arise (Dustmann, Kasanova, 
Fertig, Preston, Schmidt, 2003; Chammartin Moreni-Fontes and Cantu-Bazaldua, 2004). 
To everyone’s surprise, a massive influx of immigrants from Greece, Portugal and Spain 
did not occur after these countries joined EU.  
 
This observation is entirely consistent with the model shown in equation (1). Entry into 
the EU for a country means an acceptance of a common code of conduct and the 
maintenance of a set of institutions whose objective is to reduce the uncertainty of living 
conditions, along with a strengthening of democratic political institutions within the 
member countries.  
 
After becoming a member of EU, the variance of wealth, σ
2
wh, in the home country will 
be lowered, hence, the cost of uncertainty experienced by those living in the home   7
country, will be decreased. There will an increase the relative cost of uncertainty 






σ σ − − . The result is a decrease in the expected net present value of the 
welfare from migration, hence reducing the incentive to migrate. 
 
The entry of Greece, Portugal and Spain into the EU was accompanied by such a large 
reduction in the level of uncertainty for residents living in these countries. These 
countries had a history of civil wars, military coups, dictatorships and the suppression of 
human rights that was fresh in everyone’s mind. The entry into the EU was believed by 
most to be the vehicle that would put these kinds of uncertainties behind them once and 
for all. As a consequence, the attractiveness of these countries increased for both the 
natives of the country as well as for other people who might consider residing in them. In 
fact, the increase in the attractiveness of living in Greece, Portugal and Spain was so large 
that after decades of out migration the number of migrant stock from those countries that 
were living in the other EU countries actually decreased after the entry of those countries 
into the EU (Zeiceva, 2003; Migration Information Source, Country Profiles; US Census 
Bureau International Data Base, 1950-2007). 
  
There is a vast literature on the determinants of the convergence of per capita income 
across countries, and particularly within the EU (Nazul Islam, 2003). This research has 
largely focused on the variables affecting the first term in equation (6),  ) ( wh wf PV µ µ − , 
that reflect the differences in the expected value of income or wealth in the two or more 
regions or countries (Parikh and Van Leuvensteijn, 2003). Under normal circumstances 
the expectations about the convergence of the values of expected per capita income or 
wealth for a country aspiring to join the EU is likely to be formed well before the date of 
its actual entry. At the point of the actual entry date into the EU, there is likely to be a 
smaller change in the person’s expectations about the mean values of expected wealth 
than will be the change in peoples’ expectations about the variance in the value of their 
future wealth. 
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Applying Model to Explain Timing of Migration Flows from Hong Kong  
 
An illustration of the power of such uncertainties determining migration flows can be 
seen in the massive migrations that took place just prior to and after the decision for the 
political integration of Hong Kong into the People’s Republic of China. The annual 
migration flow from Hong Kong between 1980 and 1986 remained stable at around 
20,000 people per year. After 1986, migration out flows experienced a sharp increase to 
peak at 62,000 in 1990 (Skeldon, 1990). The primary destination countries were 
Australia, USA and Canada. The main reason for the increase in out migration was the 
uncertainty about Hong Kong’s political and economic future following the agreement 
with UK in 1984 for the transfer of its sovereignty to the People’s of Republic of China in 
1997 (Li, 2003; Salaff, 2006; Sussman, 2005; Siu-lun, 1992). The uncertainty and the 
decrease in public confidence about the future were based on the fear of Hong Kong 
being turned into a communist state with limitations on individual rights of speech and 
private property (Li, 2003). Many potential migrants did not wait in Hong Kong to see 
how the situation would turn out, but begun to migrate as soon as the regime change 
became inevitable. 
. 
The structure of the migrants from Hong Kong to those countries predominantly 
consisted of the young, educated professionals and middle class businessmen (Li, 2003; 
Siu-lun, 1992). It was estimated, in 1989, that 48.8% of total migrant population were 
between the ages of 25 and 44 of the total migrant population. 14.5% had either a 
postgraduate degree or post graduate qualification, and 23.3% were employed as 
professionals or a technical, administrative, and managerial staff before they migrated. 
The young, educated professionals are the group who are likely to have the lowest 
relocation costs. On the other hand, it is the middle class businessmen who face the 
greatest uncertainty about the future after Hong Kong is absorbed into the People’s 
Republic of China.  
 
Studies have shown that many of the migrants did not improve their level of income by 
moving away from Hong Kong (Salaff, 2006). For many, the main objective of migration   9
was to escape from the higher level of uncertainty of the future economic and political 
environment in Hong Kong. Some moved their families, while the head of the household 
continued to work or maintain their business in Hong Kong.  
 
After 1995, the flows of migration out of Hong Kong started to decrease. In addition to 
this decrease, as people became better informed over time of China’s economic 
development policies there was a significant flow of return migration back to Hong Kong 
(Sussman, 2005). Many of those returned only after obtaining a new citizenship and often 
with homes purchased abroad. With these precautions in place, an easy exit from Hong 
Kong could be facilitated, should their worst fears about the future political system in 
Hong Kong be realized.  
 
Turkish Migration to the EU 
 
The migration flows from Turkey to EU member states started during 1960s. Most of the 
migrants from Turkey went to Federal Germany starting in 1961 with the Guest Worker 
Agreement. Those flows accelerated after 1963 where the Ankara Agreement was signed 
between Turkey and European Economic Community. The number of Turkish population 
living in Germany was 6,800 at the end of 1961 but reached 712,300 by 1972 (Turkiye 
Isverenler Sendikasi Konfederasyonu, 2006). 
 
The Government of Federal Germany decided to end the Agreement on Guest Workers in 
1973 as a result of the economic crises it faced following the sudden increase in world oil 
prices. However, the number of Turkish living in Germany continued to increase between 
1973 and 1983. An important factor was the German Government’s decision to allow the 
Turkish workers to bring their wives and children under the age of eighteen to Germany. 
This reduced the uncertainty of the future for those migrating to Germany. This policy led 
to a change in the demographic structure of the Turkish population in Germany. In 1973, 
the Turkish population in Germany was around 910,500, mostly males. The number of 
Turkish females and children started to increase after 1974. By 1982, the Turkish   10
population in Germany increased to 1,580,700 (Turkiye Isverenler Sendikasi 
Konfederasyonu, 2006). 
 
Migration became a controversial policy issue in Germany because of the social and 
political problems that accompanied the increase in Turkish and other foreign groups in 
Germany. The result was the Return Support Law of November 1983 legislated by 
German government (Eryilmaz, 2002). This law provided financial assistance to those 
who wished to return to Turkey and also it decreased the age limit to sixteen for the 
family reunification
3. These policies created considerable uncertainty for the Turkish 
population in Germany. As a consequence, between 1983 and 1985, around 374,000 
Turkish migrants turned back to Turkey. After 1986, the Turkish population in Germany 
started to increase again because of the instability of the social, politic and economic 
conditions in Turkey. This was further encouraged by the new German citizenship law of 
January 1991 that allowed long term resident permits for foreign workers in Germany 
(Turkiye Isverenler Sendikasi Konfederasyonu, 2006). 
 
Migration and the Accession Process 
 
In this context, we turn to the anticipated impact of Turkey’s EU accession process on the 
decisions of potential migrants during this period. One of the important benefits of EU 
membership is that its institutions are expected to stabilize the economic and political 
conditions of a country. To gain admission, Turkey will need to make progress in 
implementing the acquis communautaire, and solve a number of ethnic/political problems 
related to the Kurdish society living mostly in East part of Turkey. It will also need to 
define the role of the armed forces in the political life of the country within EU norms. 
This process is expected to take up to 15 years to reach a conclusion. 
 
On both the economic and the political fronts, joining the EU should lower the level of 
uncertainty for residents of Turkey and improve the conditions for economic growth and 
                                                 
3 According to the return support law, if the requirements were met, in addition to 1,500 DM for each child, 
10,500 DM would be paid to the foreigners who turn back to their country and also the retirement 
premiums paid by those workers would be repaid immediately.   11
the strengthening of democratic institutions. In terms of our migration model, equation 6, 
if the accession process were to proceed smoothly then the expected variance of the 
wealth for an individual or family living in Turkey, 
2
Wh σ , would fall. This reduces the 
attractiveness of migrating in the period before Turkey is admitted to the EU and also 
after it is admitted. Not only is the per capita income for Turkey expected to converge 
toward that of the other EU countries, but also the prospect of entering the EU would 
reduce the expected variance of wealth, hence, the utility from staying in Turkey 
increases.  
 
In terms of the expected income in the future, a potential migrant would enjoy if s/he 
stayed in Turkey, the final admission of Turkey into the political union of the EU might 
not be very large. The major impact on expected income is likely to have come about due 
to implementation of the reforms and the development of the institutions needed to gain 
admission. However, the final act of entry in the EU requires a legal agreement by the 
country to abide by a set of rules governing economic and political policies that may have 
a much larger impact at the time of accession on the anticipated variance of the future 
wellbeing of its residents than it will have on the expected values of such economic 
indicators as per capita income. A law does not become a law until it is implemented. 
Hence, the level of uncertainty can be changed dramatically with the enactment of the 
law. Economic conditions are built up over time and hence expectations about future 
levels of income are more difficult to influence in the short term by a single policy action. 
 
This dampening effect on the level of uncertainty experienced by potential Turkish 
migrants within the period of accession is greatly affected by the process by which the 
final decision is made for Turkey’s admission to the EU. According to the EU rules, if 
any member country conducts a referendum and the majority of the voters say no to 
Turkey’s admission, then Turkey will be denied admission to EU. This will be the verdict 
on accession even if it has fulfilled all the requirements of the acquis communautaire. 
 
The decision making process of potential Turkish migrants concerning what they can 
expect if they remain in Turkey will be shaped according to the probability of the   12
member states voting either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Let us begin by making the assumption that if 
Turkey were to satisfy all the conditions of the acquis communautaire then after being 
recommended by the officials of the EU the legislatures of the individual countries would 
be certain to vote in favour of Turkey’s admission into the EU. In this circumstance, there 
would be only two conditions that the potential migrant must evaluate for the future 
situation of Turkey. One is the situation where Turkey meets all the conditions of the 
acquis communautaire, and by assumption, becomes a member of the EU. We denote
e
Wh µ  






σ ∗ −  the term measuring the cost of the 
future uncertainty of wealth in this state. The benefits in terms of utility that a potential 








PV σ µ − .  The 
second condition occurs if Turkey fails to fulfil acquis communautaire and can not be a 
member state of EU. The benefits derived from living in Turkey under the second 






PV σ µ − . Suppose the probability of Turkey being 
able to fulfil the obligations of the acquis communautaire is π
4, and the probability of 
not being able to fulfil the acquis communautaire is ) 1 ( π − . In the latter case, Turkey is 
not able to become a member state of the EU.  With these possibilities the net present 
value of the utility expected by a potential migrant from the act of migration from Turkey 
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Given that the objective of the acquis communautaire is to increase the social and 
economic well being of the residents of the EU, we would expect that in the same manner 
as Parikh and Van Leuvensteijn (2003) viewed the prospective convergence of incomes 
                                                 
4 π  is assumed to be less than 1.   13
on East and West Germany, a convergence of incomes would take place over time 
between Turkey and the rest of the EU. The result of successfully fulfilling the conditions 
should cause  
ve
Wh µ   to be  larger than Wh µ , while given the history of Turkey 
2 ve
Wh σ  would 
be expected  to be less than 
2
Wh σ . From equation 7, it can be seen that the net present 
value from migration to the EU will increase if the probability of Turkey fulfilling the 
acquis and becoming a member state of the EU,π , decreases.  
 
Another cause of uncertainty to be considered is the uncertainty surrounding the process 
of Turkey’s accession to EU membership. Even if Turkey fulfils the acquis 
communautaire, she still might not be able to become a member state of the EU if a 
referendum is held in a member country, such as France, and the “no” votes gain the 
majority. In short, fulfilling the acquis communautaire is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for Turkey to become a member state of the EU.  However, if Turkey makes 
the policy changes for the implementation of the acquis then it is likely to enjoy a level of 
expected wealth that is higher than if it fails to implement the acquis. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that for a resident of Turkey, the expected future wealth would not 
be as high and the expected variance of future wealth would be greater if Turkey does not 
gain final approval to enter the EU than if it were given full membership. The status of 
implementing the acquis, but not gaining membership is close to what some of the 
leadership of EU countries have called privileged association status (Casanova, 2006). 
 
The levels of utility of the three possible situations that a potential Turkish migrant needs 
to take into consideration when evaluating the benefits of remaining in Turkey (full 
admission, fulfilling the acquis communautaire but admission refused, no fulfilment of 
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The benefit of implementing the acquis communautaire and gaining full membership in 
the EU is expressed by the first term within the brackets of expression (8). It would   14
provide the best prospects for the potential Turkish migrant if she stayed home, this 
would be followed by the situation where Turkey was able to implement the acquis 
communautaire but was not able to get admission to the EU, which is denoted by the 
middle term. The worst situation, as expressed by the right hand term, would arise if 
Turkey was unable to implement the acquis communautaire. 
 
If we denote the probability of France accepting Turkey’s EU membership as a result of 
the referendum, given that the referendum will be held after Turkey fulfils the acquis 
communautaire, asρ , the probability of France vetoing Turkey’s EU membership, after 
Turkey fulfils the acquis communautaire is therefore expressed as ) 1 ( ρ − . Now the 
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Considering equation 9, when France or another member country holds a referendum the 
perceived probability is ρ < 1 that the vote will be “yes”. In this case a higher present 
value of value is obtained from migration than for the case if the referendum were not 
being held and the entry into the EU were determined solely by Turkey’s ability to fully 
implement the acquis communautaire. The change in the expected NPV from migration 
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Equation 10 shows that if it is perceived that life would better for residents of Turkey if it 
were a full member of the EU than with some sort of special association status, i.e. 
)] *
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PV σ µ σ µ − > − , the use of a system of referenda to 
determine Turkey’s final status will stimulate migration from Turkey during the 
accession period.  In fact, the greater the number of EU countries that hold such   15
referenda, the greater will the incentive be for potential migrants from Turkey to try to 
migrate to the EU during the accession period
5. The tendency to move forward the date of 
migration to before the final accession decision is made would be further strengthen by 
the fear that if Turkey does not gain admission then the EU would be likely to impose 
higher barriers on Turkish migration in the future. During the accession process the EU 
countries might be restrained in imposing higher barriers on migration from Turkey as it 




The fear of massive migration from Turkey to the member countries of the EU, if it were 
to become a full member of the European Union, might be misplaced. From a model of 
migration that specifies the utility function of potential migrants as a function of the 
difference between their expected wealth in the foreign country and Turkey, as well as 
the difference between the expected variance of wealth in the home and foreign countries, 
this conclusion appears to be in error.  The impact of EU membership on Turkish 
residents is to increase the relative wealth they will enjoy if they remain in Turkey and 
will reduce the differences in the costs of the uncertainty in terms of the variability of 
wealth from living abroad versus in Turkey.  Both impacts will encourage potential 
migrants from Turkey to remain in Turkey rather than migrate. 
 
A further implication of the model is that the efforts to restrict Turkey’s entry to the EU 
through the use of national referenda will even make the problem of Turkish migration to 
the EU worse, particularly during the accession period. Unless the EU were to impose 
increased barriers to Turkish migration, then the increased uncertainty of accession that 
such mechanisms create will encourage potential migrants to migrate now to the EU 
rather than remain in Turkey. The expected value of living of the benefit from the 
improved conditions in Turkey that would result from Turkey’s attempt to gain entry into 
the EU is decreased. 
 
                                                 
5 This statement will only strictly hold if the referendum outcomes are independent of each other.   16
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